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ABSTRACT
Inference to the Best Explanation, roughly put, appeals to the explanatory power of a theory
or hypothesis (relative to some data set) as constituting epistemic justification for it. Inference
to the Best Explanation (henceforth IBE) is a tool widely employed among all reasoners alike,
from the empirical sciences to ordinary life. Philosophical discussions do not differ in the
usualness of explanatory appeals of this  kind during serious argument.  Often enough, the
appeal is dialectically blocked, as many of our epistemic peers in philosophy offer reasons to
be skeptical of IBE. Our aim with this monograph is to assess one worry that have been raised
about this mode of inference: That explanatory power is not truth-conducive. We begin by
discussing general features of inferences and then formulating IBE in detail. Afterward, we
explicate and apply a canonical understanding of what an explanation is. This will lead to a
certain understanding of explanatory power. We undergo a case study to defend the thesis that
this  kind of explanatory power is  indeed epistemically  irrelevant – unless,  perhaps,  when
combined with other theoretical virtues. Our conclusion is that the measure what explanations
are  best  requires  taking  other  theoretical  virtues  into  account,  such  as  simplicity  and
unification. In this case, a complete assessment of IBE requires examining if, when, and how
these alleged theoretical virtues are indeed truth-conducive.
Key-words: Philosophy of science; theory choice; inference to the best explanation
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RESUMO
A inferência à melhor explicação, grosso modo, apela ao poder explanatório de uma teoria ou
hipótese (relativamente a algum conjunto de dados) como constituindo justificação epistêmica
para ela. A inferência à melhor explicação (doravante “IBE”, do inglês inference to the best
explanation) é uma ferramenta amplamente emprega por todos os raciocinadores, das ciências
empíricas  à  vida  comum.  Discussões  filosóficas  não  diferem na  habitualidade  de  apelos
explanatórios deste tipo durante argumentações sérias. Frequentemente, o apelo é dialetica-
mente bloqueado, dado que muitos de nossos pares epistêmicos em filosofia oferecem razões
para que se seja cético quanto à IBE. Nosso objetivo com esta monografia é avaliar uma das
preocupações  que  foram  levantadas  quanto  a  este  modo  de  inferência:  Que  o  poder
explanatório  não  é  verocondutor.  Nós  começamos  discutindo  características  gerais  de
inferências e então formulando a IBE em detalhes. Depois, oferecemos uma visão canônica
sobre o que uma explicação é. Isto levará a uma certa compreensão de poder explanatório.
Analisaremos um estudo de caso para defender a tese que esta noção de poder explanatório é,
de  fato,  epistemicamente  irrelevante  –  a  não  ser,  possivelmente,  quando  combinada  com
outras virtudes teóricas. Nossa conclusão é que o critério para determinar qual é a  melhor
explicação requer que se leve em conta outras virtudes teóricas além de poder explanatório,
como simplicidade e unificação. Neste caso, uma avaliação completa da IBE requer o exame
de se, quando, e como estas supostas virtudes teóricas são realmente verocondutoras.
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The Inference to the Best Explanation (henceforth IBE) is an inductive inference, in a sense to
be defined. It appeals to the difficult notion of an explanation and to an elusive measure of
which explanation is best. Our aim is to contribute to the evaluation of IBE by evaluating the
consequences of an explication of the former notion.
This monograph is organized into two parts. On the first part, our focus is describing IBE.
We discuss the nature of induction and outline the challenges of describing and justifying an
inductive mode of inference. Then, we push for a specific formulation of IBE. On the second
part, our focus is a component of IBE: the notion of explanation. We begin by explicating a
theory of explanation, one that is of special interest to contemporary metaphysicians. It is the
theory that  E explains  F if  and only  if  F holds  in  virtue  of E,  given appropriate  relata.
We clarify the notion by performing two case studies: causation and grounding as in-virtue-of
relations. We do not argue for that theory. Instead, we argue for a conditional thesis:
If we accept the above theory of explanation,  then (i) a certain notion of  explanatory
power  is  forced  upon us  and,  consequently,  (ii)  any inference  which  appeals  only  to
explanatory power will be inductively weak.
We end  with  our  argument  for  ii,  which has  been  dubbed  the  miracle  tissue  argument.
The upshot of the discussion is that any justifiable IBE must rank explanations by more than
just their explanatory power. Common properties appealed to in scientific theory choice are
simplicity, unification, and non ad hocness. We do not go as far as discussing these in detail.
Before we begin, we provide a broad overview of the epistemological debate about IBE.
“Weak explanationism” is the thesis that there can be epistemically justified beliefs obtained
through an IBE (LYCAN, 2002). What we may call “strong explanationism” adds that IBE is
a basic form of inference, in the sense of not being justifiable solely by appeal to other forms
of inference. Strong explanationism considers IBE to be justified nevertheless, and therefore
entails weak explanationism. The literature has even expressed what we may call “imperialist
explanationism”, whereby IBE provides the justification for all other inductively strong forms
of inference, and perhaps even of deductive forms of inference (HARMAN, 1965).
This monograph evaluates one critique leveled at weak explanationism. Three arguments
for skepticism about IBE have become standard in the literature. They are as follows.
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S1) Nancy Cartwright’s  simulacrum account of explanation, motivated by work in the
history  of  science,  denies  explanatory  realism.  Explanatory  realism  asserts  that
explanation is factive, that is, A cannot explain B unless A obtains. Nancy Cartwright
believes the contrary: Given the way scientists employ the concept of explanation, true
laws and theories do not really explain, and only overly idealized (and thus literally false)
laws and theories explain. Furthermore, what gets explained are events inside a model,
not real events. (CARTWRIGHT, 1983.)
S2) Bas  van  Fraassen’s  Dutch  book  argument.  He  points  to  a  dissonance  between
Bayesian  probabilities  and  IBE probabilities.  More  specifically,  he  claims  that  if  the
standard  Bayesianism probability  calculus  is  true,  and  if  degrees  of  credence  match
betting behavior, then any pattern of betting behavior motivated by IBE can fall prey to a
series of bets that are guaranteed to result in a loss in the long-run – in other words, a
Dutch book. Prima facie, adopting a probability theory susceptible to Dutch books is thus
pragmatically irrational, and this is often held to entail such adoption to be epistemically
irrational. The issue, however, is vexed. (VAN FRAASSEN, 1989.)
S3) The argument from unconceived alternatives, known from Bas van Fraassen’s work as
the “bad lot argument”. Suppose we grant the explanationist contention that the best of all
possible explanations is in general true. Still, we can only perform an IBE with the best
explanation we have come up with. Yet, quite plausibly, we often fail to come up with the
best explanation overall. Unless our best available explanation is somehow compatible
with the best explanation overall, it follows from the granted explanationist contention
that IBE will fail. The worry here is that this compatibility is rare. (STANFORD, 2006.)
These, however, are not the skeptical worries about explanationism that we wish to address.
That worry is that, no matter how much explanatory power may have, this by itself is no
indication that it is true. As we have said, we will argue this worry is accurate given a certain
notion of explanation. Our result will only be as good as the theory of explanation we rely on.
The above conclusion would not yet refute weak explanationism, for it may still be the
case that, when accompanied by theoretical virtues such as simplicity and  non ad hocness,
explanatory power is truth-tropic. We will not go into this latter discussion. However, it pays
to introduce the notion of theoretical virtue.
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A theoretical  virtue is  a property which is  positively correlated with a theory’s truth.
Theoretical  virtues  are  grounds  for  theory  choice.  This  truth-correlation  may  be  context-
sensitive, holding only locally rather than globally, in which case we have a local theoretical
virtue. Given this definition of what a theoretical virtue is, an increase in theoretical virtuosity
is automatically a gain in likelihood (at least in the relevant context). Inferences appealing to
theoretically virtuous hypotheses in their premises have an automatic gain in their inductive
strength (if the reasoner is aware of being in the relevant context). Note that what seems to be
a theoretical virtue might not be so. On this monograph, when we call something a theoretical
virtue we will generally intend them to be understood as alleged theoretical virtues.
Adequacy to the empirical data is the most obvious form of genuine theoretical virtue.
Other properties alleged to be theoretical virtues are not clearly so, and debates on the field of
theory choice focus on these other properties. Examples of disputed theoretical virtues are
simplicity, elegance, non ad hocness, unificatory power, scope, and external coherence.
The  chief  contention  of  explanationism is  that  explanatory  power  is  at  least  a  local
theoretical virtue: That, at least in some contexts, a gain in explanatory power translates into a
gain in likelihood. We are inclined to accept that, but defending it falls beyond the scope we
have chosen for this work. What we will argue for is that explanatory power is not a global
theoretical virtue.  Our argument,  in a nutshell,  is  that explanatory power can be acquired
“cheaply”,  as  it  were.  Ad  hoc complexifications  allow  one  to  explain  any  data  set  as
powerfully as one wishes. This cheapness makes it epistemically valueless. We have named
our defense of this claim the “miracle tissue argument”.
Local weak explanationism states that IBE is inductively strong in certain contexts C. We
can then make IBE globally strong by adding to it the premise that some  C  obtains. One
plausible  such context  C is  when explanatory power  is  accompanied by other  theoretical
virtues,  such as simplicity.  Thus,  theoretical  virtuosity could be taken into account in the
measure of what makes explanations better than others. The best explanation is then not most
explanatorily  powerful,  but  the  one  that  optimally  combines explanatory  power  with
theoretical virtue. Of course, if a trade-off happens to be needed, a good dose of explanatory
power must be retained. Otherwise, the resulting inference would not be explanationist at all.
Having given an overview of the epistemic issues surrounding IBE, we turn to the first
part of our monograph. We begin with an exposition of what inductive inferences are, what
inductive strength is, and the distinction between global and local inductive strength.
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PART I
A STUDY OF REASONING:
THE STRUCTURE OF INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION
To fully understand Inference to the Best Explanation, we must understand what its inferential
structure is, what an explanation amounts to, and would make an explanation the best. Part
one is dedicated to examining the first question. Part two moves on to outline a standard
answer to the second question, – a certain theory of explanation, – and arguing that it has
certain consequences for the third question.
Inductive inferences
The Inference to the Best Explanation is a kind of inductive inference. Inferences are not
basic sources of positive epistemic status.  Their  capacity,  possibly unique,  is  transmitting
positive epistemic status from premises  to  a  conclusion.1 The better  the transmission,  the
stronger  the  inference.  ‘Positive  epistemic  status’  is  a  generic  term  that  encompasses
knowledge, warrant, epistemically justified confidence, and similar statuses which the beliefs
and conjectures of inquiring reasoners may have.  The epistemic status of a proposition is
always relative to an agent in an evidential context. Whether the transmissive properties of
inferences are likewise relative to evidential contexts is, however, a point of contention.
By ‘inference’ we do not mean inference as a type or a token of a psychological process,
but  as  the  content  of  these  processes.2 This  content  is  an  unordered  series  of  specific
propositions P1, …, PN, C, where C is privileged in that the reasoner takes it to be supported
by P1, …, PN. We may understand a type of inference from this scheme by abstracting from
the specificities of each proposition and considering only the types of propositions to which
they belong. For example, we can characterize IBE as having premises citing the explanatory
power of some theory  H of relevant known data, and by having a conclusion asserting the
truth of H. Such a generic characterization is what we mean by a “proposition type”.
1 The crisp way of putting this point is due to AUDI (2011: 184).
2 The distinction between inference as process and as content was introduced to us by AUDI (2011: 177).
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To specify the inference being performed, we must take into account the type of relation
the reasoner holds to obtain between P1, ..., PN and the privileged C. If the reasoner believes
there  to  be  a  relation  of  deductive  entailment (which  we  will  explain  later),  then  he  is
performing  a  deductive  inference.  The very  same premises  and  conclusion,  linked by an
envisaged relation of defeasible support, yield an inductive inference. Of course, in any of
these cases, the alleged link may not hold between premises and conclusion. The following
inference is inductively strong if R is intended as a relation of enumerative inductive support,
but  deductively  invalid  if  R is  intended as  deductive  entailment:  “That  swans  s1 through
s1.000.000 have been white bears a relation R to the swan s1.000.001 being white.”3
Having sketched what inferences are, we may classify them into two broad classes as has
been foreshadowed:  Deductive and inductive inferences.  By ‘inductive’ we mean roughly
non-deductive, and we’ll speak of Peircean abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation
as  inductions  in  this  sense.  The  contentions  of  this  section  will  provide  a  general
understanding of how these two and other inductive inferences work.
There are multiple ways to characterize  deductive inferences. Generically, a deductive
inference is one whose premises are intended to guarantee,  in some sense, its  conclusion.
A deductive inference is valid when this intention is satisfied, whereby the conclusion is said
to be entailed  by the premises, and invalid when it is not. The intention is, presumably, the
reasoner's  intention.  There  are  at  least  three  popular  varieties  of  intended  relations  of
deductive entailment. The generic and agreed-upon requirement for deductive entailment is
that the premises in some sense guarantee the conclusion. The dispute ranges over (i) whether
the scope of this guarantee is metaphysical or purely formal and (ii) whether there is a second
requirement of relevance between premises and conclusion.
A broad characterization of guarantee can be set out in alethic modal terms: It  is not
possible  for  the  premises  to  be  all  true  while  the  conclusion  is  false.4 What  exactly  this
definition  says  depends  on  the  scope  of  possible  worlds  over  which  we  are  defining
possibility.  If the scope is metaphysically possible worlds, then the following inference is
valid: “If water is H2O then there is no largest prime number.” This is the first popular variety
of deductive entailment.5 The second variety comes when we take our scope to be logically
3 That is a single proposition, not an inference, of course. We are sacrificing technical rigor for the sake of
expository easineness; the example should be clear.
4 One might add a criterion of  non-redundancy, where the removal of any premise eliminates the guarantee
provided by the set of remaining premises.This nicety will be skipped over.
5 Perhaps one could formulate a weaker variety by choosing as a scope the set  of nomologically possible
worlds.  Then we could speak of relations of deductive entailment inside physics even if physical  law is
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possible worlds, which include worlds in which water is not H2O (but does not include worlds
in which water is not water). Then there must be an (intended) relation of logical entailment
between premises and conclusion. Now we render deductively valid the inference, “If P  P,⊃ P,
then ~ (Q  ~Q).” Of course, in reality, what counts as deductively validity will also depend∧ ~Q).” Of course, in reality, what counts as deductively validity will also depend
on the logic we adopt.  In addition,  we may distinguish between syntactic  entailment  and
semantic entailment. Not every logic admits of completeness proofs, so the distinction may be
useful. We are not sure if deductive relations inside mathematics would all be syntactical in
this sense, given Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem.
The third and final variety arises when we adopt a relevance logic. The last inference we
presented relates seemingly unrelated tautologies regarding seemingly unrelated sentences.
The premises seem irrelevant to the conclusion, in a sense that is hard to specify. Relevance
logicians argue that the relation of deductive entailment can only hold when the premises are
(all) relevant to the conclusion. There are many relevance logics, each cashing out the notion
of relevance a bit differently, but they share this broad view of deductive entailment. For the
sake of completeness, we should mention a fourth kind of logic, a hybrid between the first and
the  third:  One in  which  the  premises  must  be  metaphysically  relevant to  the  conclusion,
perhaps grounding the conclusion. Theories of deduction employing this view are called, we
believe,  “hyperintensional  logics.”  Guarantee is  necessary  but  not  enough  for  deductive
entailment. Metaphysical relevance, but not traditional logical relevance, is required.
An  inference  is  inductive  when  its  premises  are  not  intended  to  guarantee  their
conclusion, but are intended to make the conclusion sufficiently likely. Therefore, induction is
not subjected to the criterion of  guarantee, which is the universally accepted characterizing
feature  of  deduction.  Furthermore,  deductions  are  nonampliative  and monotonic,  whereas
inductions  are  not.6 There  are,  however,  two  sets  of  parallel  notions  that  characterize
deduction and induction. Let us turn first to these two parallelisms.
The first set comprises three criteria that some wish to impose on valid deductions: non-
redundancy, logical relevance, and metaphysical relevance. One can cast these in inductive
forms, respectively, in the following way. Every premise in the premise set must be such that:
(i) Were it to be removed from the set, the probability of the conclusion given the set would
contingent.  We could  also  speak  of  deduction  in  neuropsychology,  even  if  psycho-physical  bridge  laws
(supposing these to exist) are also contingent.
6 Non-monotonic logics are not standardly called deductive, as their adequacy as models are judged in terms of
how well they capture inductive patterns of inference.
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decrease; (ii) It is statistically correlated with the conclusion; (iii) It has a causal connection,
through finite causal chain in any direction, to the conclusion.
The  second  set  of  parallel  notions  comprises  inductive  counterparts  of  deductive
entailment  and deductive  validity.  In  good inductions,  the  set  of  premises  should  have  a
positive inductive relation to its conclusion. That is, the set must render the conclusion more
likely. Standardly, this is formulated in terms of a subjective interpretation of probability, i.e.
an interpretation where probabilities are degrees of belief. Since we are inferential realists
(i.e., we think inferences aim at truth), we better take the “rationalist” subjective interpretation
of probability, according to which probabilities are  rational degrees of belief (given one’s
evidence). We remain neutral on precise accounts of rational probabilities. So good inductions
increase the rational confidence levels for their conclusion. The stronger the aforementioned
positive inductive relation, the stronger the inference is.
It  may  be  impossible  to  evaluate  the  inductive  strength  of  any  inference  without
substantial  information  about  the  world.  Stathis  Psillos  (2007)  claims,  on  theoretical  and
historical grounds,  that  strong inductive inferences never  owe their  strength to  syntactical
relations between premises and conclusion, generalizing the result Nelson Goodman (1955)
obtained regarding enumerative induction. Their strength depends on the world behaving in a
certain logically contingent way (even if its behavior is metaphysically necessary). Inductive
strength thus depends on the subject matter and circumstantial detail. Prima facie, as a result
one must evaluate an induction by keeping one’s many other theories of the world in mind.
Since one cannot lay out one’s whole web of beliefs in the premises of an induction, the web
must be set apart as an implicit “background knowledge” or “evidential context.”
Wrapping up,  the  inductive counterpart  of  deductive entailment  is  a  context-sensitive
positive inductive relation, understood as an increase in rational confidence, and which we
may call inductive support or, equivalently, inductive confirmation. The inductive counterpart
of deductive validity is inductive strength but, unlike deductive validity, it comes in degrees.
The more an inference’s premises provide inductive support for its conclusion (relative to a
background worldview), the inductively stronger the inference is.
Unlike with deductive validity, the relation between inductive strength and transmission
of  epistemic  justification  is  a  bit  controversial.  Induction  is  an  inference,  and  inferential
transmission  of  epistemic  justification  comes  from  an  agent’s  reasoning  tokenizing  this
inference (from justified premises). Mentally tokenizing an inference requires  accepting (or
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believing) the conclusion on the basis of the premises (by intending them to have a certain
relation  of  support,  as  discussed  earlier).  However,  many  hold  acceptance  (belief)  to  be
epistemically justified only when the accepted proposition’s rational probability goes over a
certain threshold. Therefore, certain inductive inferences may be so weak as not to transmit
epistemic  justification  or  warrant,  despite  the  fact  that  their  premises  do increase  the
conclusion’s likelihood. An inductively strong inference can also fail to transmit epistemic
justification or warrant if the premises were not very justified to being with.7 (We remain
neutral on whether inductive inferences are ever capable of transmitting knowledge.)
From the above discussion, it follows that induction is ampliative whereas deduction is
not. Ampliation, intuitively, is an increase in information. More specifically, an increase in
information relative that what was “implicit” in the premises. A deduction’s conclusion can
regroup information in a form more congenial to our cognition and make us readily notice
(i.e. make “explicit”) something that was previously “implicit” in the premises. This is not an
ampliation in our sense. We will be more precise below.
Another difference which also holds between deduction and induction is that the former
is  monotonic, while the latter is not. Monotonicity is a property of inferences whereby the
addition of new information to a premise set P does not exclude any inference one can make
from P alone.  For  example,  if  we can  infer  that  Q from the  premises  that  P and that  P
materially implies Q, then no further premise will block this inference. Inductive inferences
are  non-monotonic:  Taking  more  information  into  account  can  alter  what  is  inductively
supported by one’s premises. For example, one may learn that there are only a million white
swans in the world, from which it follows (deductively, in fact) from us having observed a
million  white  swans  that  the  swan  s1.000.001 will  not  be  white  if  it  exists.  Non-monotonic
reasoning  is  also  called  defeasible  reasoning  for  this  reason.  New  evidence  can  defeat
defeasible reasoning, when it blocks inferences justified by the old evidence, or undercut it,
when it now renders justified an inference to a contrary conclusion.
Many epistemologists impose a criterion of  total (relevant) evidence on non-monotonic
reasoning. The criterion is that not taking all of one’s relevant evidence into account prevents
one from obtaining epistemic justification from an inductive inference. The rationale is that
7 Note that epistemic justification is not factive, in the sense that one can be epistemically justified to believe a
false premise.  This is  so even if the evidence which grounds one’s justification is,  itself,  factive.  Many
theorists during this century have taken evidence to be factive, with Timothy Williamson going as far as
taking one’s evidence to be identical to one’s knowledge, a thesis known as E = K. (There are some who take
epistemic justification to be factive, but this is a highly unorthodox position. See Justification and the Truth-
Connection by Clayton Littlejohn and its review at the Notre Dame Philosophical Review.)
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the relevant bit(s) of evidence we already own, but have ignored, may defeat or undercut our
inference,  and  it  surely  wouldn’t  be  rational  to  reason  while  ignoring  defeating  or
undercutting evidence already at hand! (One could claim that ignoring relevant evidence that
is safely non-defeating or non-undercutting does not threaten epistemically rationality, even if
one is not reflexively aware of this safety. One simple example is ignoring the testimony of an
unremarkable 1001st witness after unanimous reports from a thousand witnesses.)
Now  we  can  be  more  precise  as  to  what  ampliativity  and  monotonicity  are.  If
propositions are extensionally equivalent to sets of possible worlds (those in which they are
true), then we can model ampliation and non-monotonicity in similar ways. We can model the
information  contained  in  a  set  of  premises  as  the  set  of  possible  worlds  these  premises
exclude, i.e. worlds outside their extension.8 An inference is ampliative if and only if its set of
premises excludes less possible worlds than that set of premises added to its conclusion. The
fact that the conclusion eliminates additional possible worlds is an interesting way to see why
the conclusion is not guaranteed by the premises: The premises are compatible with at least
one world excluded by the conclusion, i.e. with a world in which the conclusion is false. The
non-monotonicity of induction is illuminated in a similar way: Additional information may
show that, probably, one is inside one of those worlds excluded by the conclusion we had
obtained earlier. (This is an example of undercutting.)
So much for the general features of inductive inference. We now turn to discuss a specific
form of induction: inference to the best explanation. We argue for a specific set of premises,
so as to guarantee that IBE has the greatest chance of being inductively strong, all the while
having premises knowable or otherwise epistemically accessible by humans.
8 Considerations about scope apply. We may be only considering nomologically, metaphysically, or logically
possible worlds. Perhaps we could even speak of epistemically possible worlds, although their precise status
vis-à-vis metaphysical possibility is very controversial. Due to a lack of technical understanding, we refrain
from explaining the use of impossible worlds.
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The inference to the best explanation
It  would be a  mistake  to  understand induction  in  general  merely as  an  “Inference  to  the
Likeliest  Hypothesis”  (ILH).  Some  inductively  strong  inferences  make  no  mention  of
probabilities. They are heuristics, a kind of “interface”, that track probabilistic relations by
mentioning other factors.9 ILH is trivial, in some sense, and should be our induction of choice
whenever  possible.  Other  forms  of  induction,  in  stark  contrast,  are  the  subject  of  heated
disputes. We engage in them nevertheless because probabilities (absolute and conditional) are
not  always  transparent.  In  fact,  these  other  inductions  are  often  the  only  way  we  could
discover certain probabilities. (As a side note, such interfaces are possible, we conjecture, due
to  numerous  trial-and-error  selections  of  heuristics  during  our  phylogenetic,  cultural,  and
ontogenetic history. Our inductive practices have evolved.)
It would be equally a mistake to consider our target inference merely as an “Inference to
the Likeliest Explanation.” We employ heuristics such as explanatory power, simplicity, non
ad hocness, unification, and external coherence, – not likelihood or relative probability, – in
assessing what the “best” explanation is. To be sure, if IBE is to be a good explanation, then
the best explanation must tend to be the likeliest explanation. That is, our sense of explanatory
goodness,  which  Peter  Lipton  (2004)  calls  “loveliness”,  must  be  fine-tuned  to  the  likely
truth.10 However,  at  least  sometimes  we  (attempt  to)  track  the  likeliest  explanation  in  a
roundabout manner: through the interface of the  loveliest or  best explanation, the one that
intuitively seems to bear marks of a true explanation. This has been called “the guiding claim”
by Lipton (2004: 124-5). So, anyway, claims weak explanationism.
Describing this interface is a challenge, comprising three tasks: (i) to state the inferential
structure of IBE, (ii) to list the criteria we use to assess potential explanatory power, and (iii)
to describe how we traded-off explanatory power and other alleged theoretical virtues, such as
simplicity  and  non  ad  hocness,  to  yield  the  composite  feature  dubbed  “goodness.”  We
construct a ranking of better and worse explanations which, hopefully, indirectly tracks true
explanations. These are challenges because, as remarked earlier, we often perform inferences
9 The general idea is present in a discussion by Peter Lipton (2004) of the relation between reasoning that
explicitly employs the Bayesian probability calculus and reasoning that has explicit explanatory appeals, like
IBE. He argues in detail that explanatory considerations are a way to indirectly track Bayesian probabilities,
which are too hard directly to assess. The relation between Bayesianism and explanationism is, however, a
whole other issue.
10 Peter  Lipton links loveliness to our  sense of  understanding.  Since we do not know what is  the relation
between our sense of understanding and genuine understanding, and since we do not know how genuine
understanding works and whether it is important, we do not mention understanding in our work.
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unaware of the heuristics being employed. In this case, it is unclear how we come to judge
some  explanation  as  “best”.  The  best  explanation  has  some  optimal  trade-off  between
simplicity (for example) and explanatory power.
One way to obtain conscious access to the principles governing IBE is to observe how it
is used by inquisitive humans such as scientists and philosophers, and perhaps even toddlers
and police officers. This observation can be either introspective, perceptual, or testimonial.
What we can do is twofold. (a) We also detect the conditions under which we infer from such
explanatory  considerations  to  conclusions  about  reality.  That  is,  we  discern  what
considerations (premises) we perform to reach what kinds of conclusions (answering ‘i’). This
is  what  we  do  here.  (b)  We also  detect  patterns  in  our  performing  considerations  about
explanatory goodness over many subjects. With this, we can discern what theoretical virtues
we appeal to (answering ‘ii’) and how we negotiate them when they conflict (answering ‘iii’).
This task explicates the notions of explanation,  explanatory power,  and theoretical  virtue.
Here we explicate only the former two.
Systematizing  the  rules  governing  ‘a’ and  ‘b’ may  be  a  task  no  more  simple  than
discovering the rules governing any other complex system, like a computer or a microphysical
system, from observing its behavior in varied contexts.11 Stathis Psillos (2007) has emphasized
the high degree of context-sensitivity in our inductive inferential practices. Hopefully, these
heuristics  can  be  roughly expressed  in  propositional  form.  They  may  not  be.  Sometimes
heuristics implemented in connectionist systems, for example, are linguistically inscrutable:
They are very intricate mathematical operations whose basic terms do not denote anything we
can recognize as an individual factor. Let us not concern ourselves with this possibility.
We  now  move  on  to  characterize  a  useful  version  of  IBE  which  is  faithful  to  our
inferential  practices.  Any  good  inference  must  have  premises  which  strongly  inductively
support  its  conclusion.  Premises must  also be epistemically  accessible  to  human beings.12
Inferences transmit epistemic justification from premises to conclusion, so an inference with
inaccessible premises is useless. Usually, stronger inductive support translates into weaker
epistemic access, and vice versa.  So there is a trade-off. The optimal trade-off point may
depend on interest  and domain.  Philosophy may require  more  easily  accessible  premises,
11 See LIPTON (2004: 13) for a similar point. Since we’ve already got your attention in this footnote, let us
make a marginal point: Our explanatory patterns may evolve over time as we learn and acclimatize to new
ways of thinking. The scope of “we” here includes academics from all areas, and it may additionally include
all sorts of investigators from outside academia, from toddlers to police officers.
12 By the ‘epistemic accessibility’ of a proposition I mean how difficult it is (for some measure of difficulty) for
agents (of a certain class) to be epistemically justified in believing it.
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whereas empirical work can handle hard-to-access premises. Our IBE will be modeled on
how it would be applied to empirical science.
To begin searching for the canonical version of IBE, let us begin examining an inference-
type (hereafter inference) so weak we cannot call it IBE.
P1. H is a plausible explanation for E.
P2. E contains our evidence.
C1. Therefore, H.
This has been called inference to a plausible explanation by Peter Lipton (2004). However, if
explanatory  considerations  are  to  be  our  ground,  the  availability  of  a  better  explanation
potentially defeats or undercuts any epistemic justification that a worse explanation could
yield. Two applications of the above inference would provide us with conflicting conclusions
in almost any scenario. To fix this, we can sharply upgrade P1 and obtain a genuine IBE. Now
we refer to H as the most plausible or best explanation.
P1. H is the best explanation for E.
P2. E contains our evidence.
C1. Therefore, H.
The first premise is now too demanding. This is related to skeptical worry S3: the “bad lot” or
“unconceived alternatives” argument. As Bas van Fraassen (1989) and Kyle Stanford (2006)
have pointed out, it is prima facie highly plausible that, in general, we have not come up with
the best of all explanations. Even if we were to be perfect in ranking the explanations we have
come up with, the one we judge the best will seldom be the global best. We would thus often
fail  to  be  in  the  position  to  accept  P1  reliably.  Revising  P1 to  “H is  the  best  available
explanation for E” makes it more epistemically accessible.
The chief worry now is that our inference thereby becomes too inductively weak. For the
IBE to be inductively strong in the first place,  it  is necessary that better explanations are
usually more likely than worse explanations. So the best explanation is usually more likely
than  worse  explanations.  Whenever  the  best  explanation  is  incompatible  with  the  worse
explanations, in most cases, any non-best explanation E will be more likely than not to be
false. This sorrowful situation will be avoided if and only if one of two things occur. First,
some contextual  detail  renders  E more  likely  than  the  best  explanation.  Second,  the  best
explanation is not incompatible with E. This can happen if E is an approximation of the best
explanation.  For  example,  classical  mechanics  is  a  kind  of  “prototype”  of  relativistic
mechanics and therefore bears some reasonable degree of truth.
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There is some reason to suspect this second scenario is common. It has been pointed out
that scientists are often at pains to come up with even a single good theory to match and
explain well their data. The reason for this may be quite congenial to explanationists: That it
is rare for false theories to be both highly explanatory and theoretically virtuous. Therefore, if
we were to rank theories according to their goodness, – which combines power with virtue, –
then the highest ranks would be dominated by true or approximately true theories, which are
(of  course)  significantly  compatible  with  each other.  Whether  this  occurs  is  an  extensive
debate in history and philosophy of science we will sidestep. If it does, skeptical worry S3 is
defeated and P1 yields a good combination of premise-accessibility and inductive strength.
The second premise P2, in its turn, is too undemanding. The evidential base E in question
may be small, shallow, and contain little variation. Whatever the merits of explanationism, it
is widely agreed that the best explanation for  small (and otherwise unremarkable) evidence
sets are not in general true. Therefore,  P2 should be revised to the effect that our evidence
base is  large,  relevantly varied,  contains the results  of crucial  experiments,13 and possibly
more.14 It is prudent for us to require E to include our total relevant evidence. Note that, in
some circumstances, the set E can be smaller than our total relevant evidence. Some evidence
can be safely ignored, as discussed above. Below these considerations become P3 and P4.
A minor terminological revision. Some hypotheses  would  explain our evidence  if they
were true.  Following LIPTON (2004), we will call those  potential explanations.  The bare
term ‘explanation’ will refer to actual explanations. Every actual explanation is a potential
explanation, of course. The premises will mention potential explanation to avoid triviality.
P1. H is the best available potential explanation for E.
P2. H is explanatorily powerful.
P3. E is safely close to our total relevant evidence.
P4. Our evidence is numerous, relevantly varied, and includes crucial tests.
C1. Therefore, H.
Notice the addition of a new premise, P2. Besides being the relative best, it must also be good
in absolute terms. (The best of a bad lot is not good at all.) Furthermore, H’s goodness cannot
be mostly due to theoretical virtues other than explanatory power. Otherwise, IBE would not
be an explanationist inference. Explanatory power must be central to measuring goodness.
13 Crucial  tests  are  normally  understood  as  tests  that  could  distinguish  between  theory  rival  theories:
An experiment where theories cross. Which tests are crucial, then, depends on the epistemic situation. 
14 We leave  as  an  open  question  whether  we should  understand  evidence  factively  (falsehoods  cannot  be
evidence).  The  matter  is  relevant  to  the  epistemic  accessibility  of  our  premises.  Factive  evidence,  like
knowledge, may not be reflexively accessible – that is, discernible based on internally available reasons. The
reflexive accessibility of factive evidence and knowledge is compromised under epistemic externalism.
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There  is  a  further  way  to  improve  IBE’s  inductive  strength  without  making  it  too
unusable.  We  can  require  that  we  have  performed  an  adequate  search  for  explanations.
Adequate search can be understood factively, as a search that makes it objectively likely that
we have come up with the actual explanation. This creates a problem of epistemic access:
How confident can we rationally be that we have performed an adequate search? Another way
is to understand adequate search non-factively. For example, we may say we have searched
adequately when competent scientists have put in a lot of effort. As has become a pattern, this
eases  epistemic  access  at  the  same time as  it  weakens  inductive  strength,  given that  our
effortful attempts may not be truth-conducive at all.
Finally, the conclusion merits a revision. Suppose our premises are true and H obtains.
Still,  H might not be the actual explanation of E.  Explanation, we believe, requires some
connection between  explanandum and  explanans. However we understand that connection,
the connection may fail to obtain even under favorable conditions. (We will discuss this on
Part II.) A good example is causal preemption. Consider a toy example. A glass was broken,
and the best explanation is  that  someone threw a rock at  it.  Well,  suppose someone did.
However, there is a rather hidden and improbable Rube-Goldberg-like mechanism that, by
happenstance, led some other blunt object to break the glass before the rock could. So the
rock-throw does not explain the glass-break. (For a discussion, see LIPTON, 2004: 58-9.)
From all these wrinkles and caveats, and suspending judgment about the factivity of some
relevant notions, we obtain the following as a canonical version of IBE:
P1. H is  the best  available  potential  explanation among set S of competing potential
explanations for E.
P2. H is explanatorily powerful.
P3. The set S is the product of an adequate search.
P4. E is safely close to our total relevant evidence.
P5. Our evidence is numerous, relevantly varied, and includes crucial tests.
C1. Therefore, H is true and the actual explanation of E.
In case we already know that  H is  true,  we can that  information as  a  sixth premise and
perform the above inference to conclude simply that H is the actual explanation of E.
Recall Stathis Psillos’s point that the evaluation of inferences must be topic-specific and
context-sensitive  (henceforth,  just  “context-sensitive”).  This  is  something  that  has  been
seemingly established about enumerative induction in particular,  given Nelson Goodman’s
grue paradox whereby not all predicates are projectible (generalizable). Given this, we owe an
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account  of  how we  could  have  provided,  with  a  straight  face,  a  general  and  seemingly
context-free form to an inference such as IBE, which is applied in quite “messy” real-life
contexts (in Psillos’s words). The answer is that we have formulated IBE with terms that,
hopefully, lend themselves to such context-sensitive evaluation. Here are a few examples.
P1 employs the notion of best available potential explanation. We have argued elsewhere
that some alleged theoretical virtues humans appeal to in assessing goodness, such as  non
ad hocness  and simplicity,  do  have local, context-specific truth-conducibility. Furthermore,
quite  plausibly  humans  have  learned  to  employ  these  theoretically  virtuous  heuristics
precisely because of their truth-conducibility. To do that, then, our goodness judgments would
have to track, in a contextually-sensitive way, truth-conducive properties.
P3 mentions  adequate search. Possibly, our efforts at coming up with hypotheses also
reflect our implicit understanding of the world and of relevant circumstantial details, as they
do in our enumerative inductive practice.  For example,  we might have promising guesses
about what potential defeaters may be present (PSILLOS, 2007: 443). This leads us to come
up with certain hypotheses rather than others in the limited timespan we have available.
Finally, what determines whether our considered evidence E is “safely close” to our total
evidence,  and  whether  E  is  “relevantly  varied”,  sufficiently  numerous,  etc.,  may  not  be
determinable  abstractly,  but  must  be  determined  by  the  details  of  the  context  at  hand.
Hopefully, we are competent enough at recognizing what the context demands, so that our
access to P4 and P5 is not too hazy.
Now that we have settled for a canonical version of IBE, after discussing many of its
intricacies  and  possible  modifications,  we  move  on  to  discuss  what  explanation  and
explanatory power are. In the end, we offer the miracle tissue argument against the global




METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION AND EXPLANATORY POWER
For long, humans have been engaged in explanatory practice. These practices have been the
subject of close scrutiny. Whereas the remote origins of methodic thinking about thinking are
at present unknown, it is known that at least since Aristotle the practice of explaining the
world has been the object of philosophical attention. Based on what scientists and other able
thinkers  have  offered  as  explanations  of  the  world,  other  competent  intellectuals  have
attempted to explicate (i) what the practice amounts to, (ii) its importance or lack of thereof
for human practical interests, and (iii) its epistemological and metaphysical import, which in
turn informs the utility of explanation for human cognitive interests. Below, we review two
broad kinds of theory of explanation: psychologism and non-psychologism. We then explain a
distinctively metaphysical conception of explanation within the non-psychologist paradigm
and argue that this conception entails a specific conception of explanatory power. We finish
by providing the miracle tissue argument to the conclusion that this kind of explanatory power
is not a global theoretical virtue.
Reasons why
Throughout  the  long  discussion  about  this  topic,  a  chief  point  of  dispute  is  whether  the
distinctively scientific  and philosophical explanation of things is attributable to reality or if,
instead, it is something with mere communicative utility or psychological reality (in a certain
sense to be specified). We may, following Alexander Bird (2005), sieve the theorizing about
this matter into two broad camps: “subjectivism” and “objectivism” about explanation. For
reasons that will be clear, the way we have developed Bird’s categorization recommends that
these two terms be substituted by “psychologism” and “anti-psychologism” about explana-
tion. As such, we will often employ the latter pair instead. Let us being with subjectivism.
To a first approximation, subjectivists regard explanations as mind-dependent. In more
detail, subjectivists believe explanations exist only relative to human beings or other agents
capable of propositional thought. In even more detail, subjectivists maintain that explanations
16
are  not  relations  between objects  in  the  external  world,  –  however  the  external  world  is
understood, – but rather processes that alter one’s way of thinking about the external world.
One formulation of subjectivism mentioned by Daniel Nolan (2014: §4) is that “explanation is
a matter of what representations have what effects on us.” His formulation rings with our
understanding of the term.
Vaguely  stated,  one  early  subjectivist  family  of  theories  has  it  that  explanations  are
whatever transform something unfamiliar to us into something familiar, or which otherwise
satisfies  some sort  of  cognitive  discomfort  we have  while  contemplating  a  phenomenon.
Explanations here may be narratives, diagrams, speech acts, and theories. It should be said
that  such  a  reduction  in  cognitive  discomfort  should  not  be  obtained  through  illusion,
e.g.  through a false  theory or  a misleading diagram. There can,  thus,  be some degree of
objectivity preserved in the subjective view. However, as Alexander Bird put it, subjectivism
holds that explanations do not “constitute part of the way things are.”15 At best, explanation
depends on the way things are in the same way that elegance or color, on standard accounts,
do: As a response-dependent or  observer-relative feature of reality. Facts explain each other
only insofar as their mention by a competent human communicator can yield the sought-after
reduction in cognitive discomfort. There is no mind-independent relation of explanation in
this sense  of  “mind-dependence.”  This  makes  clear  why  we  judge  “psychologism”  an
appropriate label for subjectivism.
A similar subjectivist point of view is, roughly, that explanations are that which result in
our  understanding a  subject  matter.  Understanding,  here,  is  not  to  be  understood  as  an
epistemic achievement such as knowledge of explanation. Rather, understanding should be
understood in one  of  two ways.  First,  as  acquiring a  sense of  understanding.  A sense of
understanding may be  nothing but  the  loss  of  a  cognitive  discomfort  such as  a  sense  of
puzzlement,  or  perhaps  the  gain  of  some  new  phenomenal  aspect.  Second,  as  acquiring
pragmatic,  discursive,  mathematical,  or  other  kinds  of  competence in  “dealing”  (in  some
sense) with the subject matter. In this sense one can understand a machine by learning how to
operate it; or understand a language by learning how to speak it; or understand a complex
theory by seeing how its claims, predictions, and equations fit together.
We have introduced subjectivism as a point of contrast to objectivism, so that its core
claims can be understood more vividly. We are not interested here in critiquing these rivals to
15 BIRD (2005: 89).
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objectivism. Instead, we want to take up a specific objectivist view of explanation, – which
we’ll call inflationary objectivism, – and explore its consequences. That is, we will argue for
conditional  theses:  If  one accepts  that  inflationary objectivism,  then  certain  things  follow
about explanatory power, goodness and, finally, Inference to the Best Explanation.
Objectivism  (inflationary  or  not)  is  not  committed  to  a  realist  metaphysical  theory.
Metaphysical  realism,  broadly  construed,  states  that  there  are  entities  whose  existence  is
ontologically independent of us and, furthermore, that some of their properties are also thus
independent.16 Objectivists  may well  regard  the  world’s  constitution  as  dependent  on  our
minds. The minimal form of objectivism about some x just requires that facts about that x do
not depend on some certain aspect of our psychology. In this case, explanatory relations are
independent of what propositions have what cognitive effects in us. In this precise sense, one
may be an objectivist about explanation even if one holds an idealist metaphysics of one’s
explananda. The world may be grounded in one’s mind, but the explanatory relations in this
world w are independent of any psychological effects which descriptions of w may produce.
Let  us  say,  then,  that  subjectivists  are  psychologistic  and  that  objectivists  are  anti-
psychologistic about explanation.
There are deflationary varieties of objectivism. Nancy Cartwright’s simulacrum account
of  explanation,  reviewed in  the  introduction  (under  skeptical  worry  S1),  is  an  anti-realist
version of objectivism. Explanation exists only within false models.  Carl Hempel and Paul
Oppenheimer, in 1948, provided an objectivist theory of explanation that achieved a status of
orthodoxy for two or three decades in the twentieth century (SALMON, 2006: §1), but which
is also deflationary. Although their theory is realist about explanations, explanations are not
understood as metaphysical connections (in a sense we’ll render more precise).
Theirs  is  the Deductive-Nomological  theory  of  explanation (henceforth,  D-N theory).
Without  going into  too  much burdening detail,  their  account  is  that  the  explanation  of  a
particular event is a collection of matters of fact (“initial conditions”) together with at least
one true universal natural law. Roughly put,  together they should be such as to entail the
explanandum.  The  explanation  is  not  an  inference  or  argument,  but  the  laws  and  initial
conditions themselves who make themselves susceptible to such an inference. Note that with
the  same structure  one  can  also  specify  what  is  a  D-N explanation  of  laws,  rather  than
particular events. It can even be extended to statistical laws.
16 For the many ways of formulating metaphysical realism, see  Realism and Anti-realism (2006), by Stuart
Brock and Edwin Mares.
18
Inflationary objectivism can be introduced by noting three divergences with this standard
D-N theory.  First,  sometimes D-N explanations are  symmetric.  Whenever  a certain set  of
conditions {C1, ..., Cn} is sufficient for an event E,  given a set L of laws, one can not only
deduce E from L + {C1, ..., CN}, but also deduce CK from E + L + ({C1, ..., CN} – CK ). Second,
sometimes D-N explanations are reflexive. One can trivially deductive-nomologically explain
a true universal natural law in terms of itself. Third, D-N explanations were given in a milieu
where regularist accounts of laws of nature were orthodoxy. On this view, natural laws merely
sum up what has so far occurred, and is neither (i) a governing principle that makes particular
matters of fact be a certain way, nor (ii) an accurate description of some other governing
principle, such as an underlying causal power. The laws are ontologically posterior to the
subsumed events, which occur ungovernedly. A D-N theory of explanation is compatible with
a governing view of laws, but we have called “standard D-N theory” a D-N theory which
coupled to a regularist conception of natural law. A standard D-N explanation, therefore, does
not require there to be a “metaphysical connection” from explanans to explanandum.
Some  people  think  that  objective  explanation  is  a  kind  of  metaphysical  connection.
People who think that are  inflationists  about explanation. The reasoning is that the expla-
nation  of  an  x is the  reason  why x obtains.17 These  are  not  intentional or  epistemic
reasons-why, but in some sense ontological ones. A seemingly equivalent formulation is that
the explanation of something is that in virtue of which that something obtains.18
Standardly, explanations are thought to be irreflexive and asymmetric.  No  x can be the
reason why  x itself obtains, and no  x  can obtain in virtue of itself. Hence the irreflexivity.
Furthermore, if x is the reason why y obtains, then y cannot be the reason why x obtains; and
if  y obtains  in  virtue  of  x,  then  x  cannot  obtain  in  virtue  of  y.  Hence the antisymmetry.
Coupling  irreflexivity  to  antisymmetry,  one  obtains  asymmetry.  The  asymmetry  of
explanation is widely accepted (SCHNIEDER, 2011: fn. 21).
This metaphysical conception of explanation qua reason-why, as it is sometimes put (e.g.
SKOW, 2016), is objectivist, since it is a standard view that the reason why any p obtains is
independent of the psychological effects that p, or its description, would have on agents.
17 When we say that “A is the reason why B”, we are not using ‘reason’ in its intentional sense, as when A is an
agent that intended B to obtain and acted on that intention. We are also not using it in its epistemic sense, as
when A is evidence for B.
18 We may also say x explains y if and only if y obtains due to x. A fourth manner of speaking is to say that x
explains y if and only if “y because x” is true, given a certain usage of ‘because’. Benjamin Schnieder (2011)
understands certain ‘because’ statements as explanatory. He moves on to develop a logic for ‘because’, but
focusing on non-causal explanation.
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Causation  and  metaphysical  grounding  have  been  proposed  as  kinds  of  reason-why.
Before discussing them, let us briefly consider potential counterexamples to the asymmetry of
inflationary objective explanation. The proposed asymmetry of in-virtue-of relations may be
part of what led theorists to believe their relata to be events rather than particulars. At least, if
events  are  understood  in  Jaegwon  Kim’s  terms,  as  the  instantiation  of  a  property  by  a
particular at a time. Plausibly, the existence of a particular p at t0 can be the reason why that
same particular p exists at t1, given an endurantist view of persistence. That is, once they have
begun existing, objects can be the metaphysical basis for their own continued existence. But,
by  indexing  particulars  to  times,  which  is  partially  what  events  in  Kim’s  sense  do,  this
reflexive counterexample to the asymmetry of grounding is blocked: the  relata  are distinct
events. Below we very briefly sketch two other interesting counter-examples.
The existence of a necessary being has been theorized to be “its own ground” (BLISS &
TROGDON, 2016: §6.2). Since grounding is purported to be a metaphysical explanation, this
would deny the irreflexivity of explanation. A rebuttal is that such beings would rather seem
to be grounded in metaphysical law, whatever its nature, or to be simply groundless, obtaining
in  virtue  of  nothing.  Groundlessness  is  one  way  of  capturing  the  phenomenon  of
fundamentality, and fundamentality one way in which a being can be necessary.
A final counterexample would be causation through closed timelike curves (“time loops”
in  General  Relativity).  Some  speculative  cosmologists  theorize  their  existence.  Suppose
causation or grounding is transitive and suppose that there is a time loop at the beginning of
time.19 Then, seemingly, one would have events that obtain in virtue of themselves. If so, then
inflationary  explanation would be  neither  antisymmetric  nor  irreflexive.  A rebuttal  is  that
transitivity is implausible if we take the above as substantive metaphysical relations; anyway
this is a subject of much controversy (SCHNIEDER, 2011: fn. 22).
These latter  two examples trade in very extreme metaphysics.  Rather  expectedly,  our
intuition about the reason why things obtain (in specific, that reasons-why are asymmetric)
would break down for events that are fundamental in the synchronic and diachronic order of
things – that is, respectively, events at the fundamental level at a moment in time and events at
the beginning of time. Nevertheless, such relations remain widely accepted as asymmetric,
and plausibly they are indeed asymmetric in most cases. We now turn to causal explanation.
19 Strictly speaking, there would be no beginning of time. One solution to Einstein’s field equations, in a way
apparently  consistent  with  the  standard  ΛCMD model, is a model with time-like closed curves at theCMD model,  is  a  model  with  time-like  closed  curves  at  the
beginning of time. It has been discovered by the Princeton astrophysicist John Richard Gott III.
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Causal explanation
By ‘theories of causation’, we mean theories of what is understood today as ‘effective causa-
tion’ (which might not be what Aristotle himself understood by the Greek counterpart of the
term). Many believe that causal relations are explanatory relations in reality. One case is that
certain elements in an event’s total causal history are explanatory of that something. Another
case is that a complex event or series of events can be explained constitutively in terms of
more basic causal relations: a mechanism.
 Causation has played a large role in many scientific theories and was an integral part of
mechanistic models of concrete (i.e. spatiotemporal) reality. It is central to many theories in
the  history  of  philosophy.  Nonetheless,  during  much  of  the  twentieth  century,  interest  in
causation declined.20 This is likely due to two factors. First,  some philosophers of physics
forcefully argued that there is no role for causation in contemporary physics (e.g. RUSSELL,
1912). Second, the intellectual mores among the Anglophone philosophical community was,
by and large, an anti-metaphysical brand of empiricism. This led many to accept a form of
“deflationism” about causation, if not downright eliminativism. Nowadays interest has been
rekindled. Analytic metaphysics has grown sharply and its practitioners have found multiple
theoretical and explanatory roles for causation. Furthermore, as far as we know, there has
been a leveling of the playing field between philosophers of physics who assert and who deny
that causation has a role in quantum and relativistic physics.
Problems  about  efficient  causation  can  be  grouped  into  three  kinds,  according  to
SCHAFFER (2016). These problems were formulated assuming the causal relata are events.
The formulation of the problems does not seem to depend on a specific theory of events.
First, not every sequence of events bears causal relations. What is required for a causal
relation to obtain in such a sequence? Second, causal relatedness seems to have a direction,
since causes bear a relation to effects that is not born the other way around. How should
we  understand  this  directionality?  The  third  arises  from  a  divergence  from  a  common
intuition. Some people judge that the obtaining of a causal relation is determined only by the
intrinsic features of the causal  relata and, perhaps, also a governing natural law.21 However,
the analysis of various cases has led many to accept, as necessary for causation to obtain,
20 Chapter 7 of Bas van Fraassen’s The Scientific Image (1980) comments on how discredited that notion was
during the time of his writing.
21 See PAUL & HALL (2013: §1.3).
21
background  conditions other  than  the  causal  relata.22 In  these  cases,  how  should  one
distinguish within a situation between causes and merely background conditions? These are
the problems of connection, direction, and selection, in Schaffer’s terminology. We are unsure
whether it is possible to solve one problem without thereby solving the other two.
There are many models of causation.  Some models are deflationary, in a sense.  They
uphold  causation  as  real,  but  deny  that  it  is  an  element  of  reality  that  “produces”  other
elements of reality. Causal relations are not, in these models, reasons why things obtain. They
are  mere  epiphenomena.  Other  models  of  causation  are  inflationary,  in  a  corresponding
opposite sense: Causes do “produce” their effects and are therefore things in virtue of which
their effects obtain. The objectivist theory of explanation under discussion does not consider
deflationary causation as a kind of explanation.  Explanations are  held to  be metaphysical
connections and, no matter how hard it is to unpack the notion of a metaphysical connection,
epiphenomena are manifestly not metaphysical connections. Causation must be inflationary.
Not every kind of causation called ‘inflationary’ is indeed inflationary, as we’ll see.
Which models are inflationary and which are deflationary? It would be a tall order to
review  a  number  of  prominent  models  and  assess  where  they  lie  in  the  inflationary-
deflationary axis. We will settle with less than that. This is because, fortunately,  Jonathan
Schaffer (2016) provides a categorization that eases our work. Let us consider theorists who
satisfy three conditions. They are realists about causation; they are dealing with the problem
of causal connection; and they believe causation can be analyzed (i.e. is not primitive). Such
theorists roughly divide themselves into two camps: probabilism and processism.
Probabilism.
According to this position, causation is a kind of “pattern of co-occurrence.” Causation has to
do with one or another form of strong positive correlation between events. This correlation
can be understood statistically, modally, or nomically (with a regularist view of laws). None is
fit for causal explanation  as we are understanding it. An example of the former is Wesley
Salmon’s  model  in  which  C causes  E if  and only if  there is  a  statistically  homogeneous
partition of the probability space in which C is statistically relevant to E.23
22 John L. Mackie’s INUS account of causation is an attempt to deal with background conditions: C causes E iff
C is a necessary but insufficient part of a condition which is, in its turn, sufficient but unnecessary for E.
23 Wesley  Salmon  (2006:  §3.1)  provides  an  introduction  to  the  “statistical  relevance”  (S-R)  model  of
explanation. For another example, see Patrick Suppes’s A Probabilistic Theory of Causality (1970). Note that
statistics and probability can be understood modally too.
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The simplest example of a modal account has it that C causes E if and only if (a) if C
were to obtain, E would obtain, and (b) if C were not to obtain, E would not obtain. Two
things  which  satisfy  a and  b are  said  to  be  counterfactually  dependent.  There  are  more
complicated versions, such as David Lewis’s, which attempt to avoid problems such as causal
overdetermination and causal preemption.
Sometimes causation is understood as a nomic relation between cause and effect. If the
account is to be understood as probabilistic, the notion of lawhood it employs must also be
probabilistic.  Nomic  connections  must  be  held  as  nothing  but  certain  patterns  of  co-
occurrence  (which  can,  in  turn,  be  understood  either  statistically  or  modally).  These  are
known as regularist (or Humean) accounts of natural law.
Wesley Salmon was an important theorist of causal explanation. He provided a three-way
distinction between “three fundamental views on [causal] explanation” (2006: §4.2) which
have “dominated the discussion of scientific explanation from the time of Aristotle to the
present” (2006: 62). We were puzzled to notice that his three-way distinction misses entirely
any non-probabilistic  account  of causation.  Perhaps this  view of history reflects  the deep
entrenchment that deflationary view of causation apparently had just fifty years ago.
He divides into ontic, epistemic, and modal views of causation. The ontic view has it that
explanations of P are worldly facts (or reports  of these facts)  conditional on which P has
high(er) objective probability. This is an objectivist and probabilistic account of explanation.
Specific ontic views will depend on specific theories of objective probability. Below we will
see examples of causation in which the cause reduces the probability of the effect.
The epistemic view is  that  P is  explained by whatever  E renders P (more) rationally
expectable. That is, the degree of rational credence in “P given E” is high or at least increased.
Presumably, rational degrees of credence are always relative to an epistemic context (in which
an  agent  might  partake).  This  account  is  also  objectivist  (i.e.  anti-psychologistic)  and
probabilistic, since degrees of rational credence are independent of the cognitive effects of
propositions and representations.  Yet it  is  not  inflationary.  Neither epistemic relations nor
patterns of co-occurrence are metaphysical connections.
Finally,  the  modal  view  is  that  P is  explained  by  whatever  E  necessitates  P,  in  the
Carnapian intensional sense that P is true in all possible worlds in which E is true. This is also
clearly  anti-psychologistic  and  “probabilistic”  (i.e.  set  out  in  terms  of  patterns  of  co-
occurrence). Salmon is not referring to a metaphysically “thick” notion of necessitation.
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Processism.
The other broad position suggested by Schaffer sees causation as the occurrence of a certain
physical process which results in the effect. The cause will be a selected factor in the physical
process. Schaffer (2016: §2) sums up this view by saying “causing is physical producing.”
The big challenge here is specifying, non-circularly, what a physical process or a physical
production amounts to. Some specifications end up with a “patterns of co-occurrence” view of
physical production, in which case processism collapses into probabilism.
Unlike  probabilism,  processism  allows  that  causes  decrease the  probability  of  their
effects.  Here  is  an  example,  due  to  Wesley  Salmon  and  retold  in  by  Nancy  Cartwright
(1983:  25).  Suppose bits  from equally large samples  Uranium-238 and Polonium-214 are
drawn from in a random manner and then put before a Geiger counter (a kind of radiation
detector). Suppose they have a probability of decaying, at any given moment, of 10% and
90%, respectively.  When they do decay, the Geiger  counter is  intuitively  caused  to beep.
Since samples are being drawn randomly from equinumerous samples, the total probability of
the  Geiger  counter  beeping  at  any  given  time  is  0.5*0.9  +  0.5*0.1,  which  equals  0.5.
However, the probability of there being a beep conditional on an Uranium-238 sample having
been  drawn is  merely  0.1,  lower  than  our  prior  probability.  Nevertheless,  intuitively  the
Uranium decay does cause the beep. Processist views are usually able to capture this fact by
noting  that  there  is  a  physical  process  linking  the  Uranium  decay  with  the  beep.  On
probabilist views, on the other hand, a factor which decreases the probability of an event
could never be a cause of that event.
The central theoretical issue for processist views is: What distinguishes genuine physical
processes  from  “pseudo-processes”,  such  as  the  spatiotemporal  continuous  path  which
shadows traverse on surfaces? (MAYES, n.d.: §4a.) One demarcation criterion is that genuine
physical  processes are  sequences of  causally  linked events.  The shadow’s  movement is  a
pseudo-process because each step in the movement does not cause the next. The account is
appealing, but it makes processism fail as an account of causation.
Other  three  demarcation  criteria  constitute  the  views  called  interventionism (or
‘manipulationism’),  transferentism, and what we may call  strict processism.24 We will argue
that the former two are inadequate as accounts of causal explanation.
24 Strict processist views partake in what is called “process philosophy”, whose metaphysics is built out of
processes rather than static 3D particulars or static temporal stages of 4D particulars. We do not know much
of this view. Not all processist views partake in process philosophy, in Schaffer’s usage.
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Some accounts proposed as interventionist are really criteria for the presence of causes.
We are interested in the ones proposed as definitions of causation. Interventionism, broadly,
states:  Whatever  elements  C1 of  a  system  can  be  interfered  with by  an  “appropriately
exogenous cause” C2, – not necessarily by an intentional agent, – so as to yield effects which
are in principle predictable (WOODWARD, 2016). So, if an event E can be reliably indirectly
manipulated through a direct manipulation of another event C1, at least in a certain context,
then C1 is a cause of E (in that context). Interventionism has become a large, mathematized,
multidisciplinary research program. Its models are actively tested for predictive power.
Two difficulties of this view, as Woodward recounts in the aforementioned article, are
that (i) some causes may inhabit systems which are in principle not interferable with, and that
(ii)  the very notion of  interference is  only  comprehensible  in  terms of  causation  (e.g.  as
exogenous cause),  leading to  circularity.  Even dismissing these problems,  interventionism
seems to be just another “pattern of co-occurrence” definition of causation. All that is said is
that there is a modal relation between events of direct intervention and certain other events.
Transferentist  accounts  also  seem  to  be  mere  “pattern  of  co-occurrence”  views.
According to Douglas Ehring (1986), transferentist theories hold that causation occurs if and
only if (a) two bodies are in spatiotemporal contact, (b) they possess quantitative properties of
the same kind, and (c) one body loses a quantity that is then gained by the other. Examples
include “velocity, momentum, kinetic energy, [and] heat.” Furthermore, it must be the case
that (d) such a change in quantities in each body would not occur except for the presence of
the other body. These are just modal relations. Perhaps we have not done justice to the view.
There may be other formulations which have a metaphysically thick notion of transference.
Finally,  strict  processism  is  part  of  the  overarching  program  of  process  philosophy
(described in SEIBT, 2017). We were unable to find a canonical and precise statement of what
processes are, but the idea is that they are primitive “developments” or “activities.” Causation
is then seen as a primitive kind of development or activity. This seems like the metaphysical
notion of causation that is needed for the objectivist model explanation we are interested in.
The  apparent  failure  of  interventionism  and  transferentism  to  provide  non-circular
accounts of causation is understandable. Notions such as “physical process” and “physical
production” are very similar to causation. There is no reason to expect the former two to the
conceptually or ontologically prior to the latter.
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Their failure to escape the “patterns of co-occurrence” paradigm is also understandable.
These notions are as opaque as causation is. A similar phenomenon occurs in the analysis of
notions such as “making”, “metaphysical connection”, “necessitation”, and “supervenience”.
What are intuitively metaphysically thick notions are analyzed merely statistically or modally,
leaving many metaphysicians dissatisfied.
Furthermore,  as  in  the  analysis  of  knowledge,  there  has  been  a  proliferation  of
“preemption-style”  counterexamples  to  all  attempts  of  analysis.  Whenever  the  relation
whereby A causes B is ontologically  posterior  to both A and B, – whereby A and B must
satisfy a certain pattern of co-occurrence which  antecedes their bearing a causal relation, –
one can contrive a scenario in which A and B satisfy this pattern by accident, without really
bearing a causal relation. This has led many to start taking certain metaphysical relations as
irreducible to statistics or modality. These relations are thus called hyperintensional.
Primitivism and conclusion.
Some realists about causation do not think it can be completely analyzed. That is, there is no
successful analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for causation – unless these
conditions mention causation itself or some notion derivative of it. If causal primitivism is
correct, then there would seem to be an explanatory relation that is a fundamental aspect of
reality. Causes are primitively connected with their effect. Perhaps all explanatory relations,
that is, all in-virtue-of relations or reasons-why, are fundamental. This strikes us as plausible.
The upshot of the discussion, we think, is this. Causal explanation, in the sense of ‘expla-
nation’ we are exploring, requires that causes constitute reasons why their effects occur. Brute
patterns of co-occurrence seem to render causes explanatorily inert relative to their effects.
What  is  needed for  reality’s  structure  to  be explainable  are  governing laws,  fundamental
dispositions, strict processes, nonregularist causation, and other varieties of metaphysically
thick relations. Their metaphysical thickness cannot be analyzed away, so to speak.
Having  made  these  sadly  obscure  but  suggestive  remarks,  we  leave  our  superficial
discussion of causation aware of its radical provisionality. We now move to the second variety
of reason-why we have set out to discuss: metaphysical grounding. In this work, we will not
touch upon other alleged kinds of reason-why. Some of these are: (i) mathematical reasons-
why, (ii) statistical  reasons-why, (iii)  reasons-why that surface in the study of emergence,
dynamic systems, and other complex systems, and (iv) normative reasons-why.
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Metaphysical grounding
We have been discussing  in-virtue-of  relations  or,  equivalently,  metaphysical  explanation.
One such relation is causation, depending on how it is modeled. Seemingly, there are non-
causal forms of metaphysical explanation. What follows is a list of reasons-why that has been
proposed  in  the  literature.  Some  of  these  have  been  discussed  in  LANGE  (2016).
We will discuss only those of the last kind.
(1)  Essential  constitution  and  composition.  The  essence  of  electrons  explains  why
electrons have charge. The essences of water and H2O explain why they bear an identity
relation  or,  at  least,  a  constitution  relation.  The  essence  of  {x}  explains  why  it  is
essentially mereologically composed by x.
(2) Logical-mathematical reasons. Some (but possibly not all) proofs explain why their
theorems hold. For example, why there is an infinity of primes, or why geodesic paths
appear curved given certain conditions.
(3) Statistical reasons. The law of regression to the mean explains why most sequels
to great movies are worse.
(4) An  assortment  of  other  reasons-why.  Intentions  may  explain  intelligent  action.
Natural functions may explain normative properties. Natural functions may also explain
the  veridicality  conditions  of  representations.  Boundary  conditions  may  explain  the
temporal persistence of a system, such as a convection current. Absences may explain
why certain events occur, as when the absence of watering explains a plant’s death.
(5) Metaphysical grounding. Perhaps subvenient facts ground supervenient facts, and
thus explain them. Relations are sometimes grounded in, and thus explained by, the
intrinsic  properties  of  its  relata.  Truths  are  grounded  in  the  world;  hence  the
truthmaking relation  is  seen as  an explanatory relation.  A drop in  the mean kinetic
energy of particles grounds and explains a drop in temperature (SKOW, 2016: 29).
Causation and grounding appear to have something in common: Their relata end up with an
in-virtue-of relation. Caused events obtain in virtue of their causes. Grounded events obtain in
virtue  of  their  grounds.  Some  have  proposed  a  strong  analogy  between  causation  and
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grounding. Jonathan Schaffer (2012), for example, claims that causation is a diachronic lin-
kage of distinct existences, whereas grounding is a synchronic linkage of distinct existences.
Others think they are strongly disanalogous, such as Sara Bernstein (2016). If so, then the
in-virtue-of relations they create are also of different kinds. Instead of being a natural kind
term, the term ‘in-virtue-of relation’ could denote merely a family of very similar relations.25
Unfortunately,  we have  but  a  metaphorical  or  imagistic  grasp  of  this  relation  or  relation
family. Metaphors such as “linking” and “connecting”, “producing” and “making”, “building”
and “transferring”, etc. are common, but difficult to cash out. We are unable to explicate them.
Partly due to this difficulty and partly due to the proliferation of contrived counterexamples
(as in the analyses of knowledge and causation) have led some people to become primitivists
about  these  notions  and  limit  themselves  to  investigating  (i)  their  structural  and  logical
features, (ii) the strengths and weaknesses of theories employing them, and (ii) whether they
are identical and, if not, in what ways they are similar.
Grounding is a theoretical notion designed to capture the judgment that certain things A
“owe” their very existence to the existence of something else B, whereby the A’s are grounded
in the B’s. Let us call this metaphysical dependence. Perhaps the A’s are token-identical to the
B’s, or perhaps constituted or composed of the B’s, or perhaps they are bear no ontological
overlapping but are nevertheless related in this special manner. According to Jessica Wilson
(2014),  what  is  distinctive  about  theories  of  grounding  is  that  all  these  varieties  of
metaphysical dependence, called small-g “grounding”, constitute a single notion, which she
calls capital-G “Grounding”.
She argues that there is no theoretical role for positing such a comprehensive category: it
unifies  relations  that  are  too  distinct  from  one  another,  becoming  too  broad  to  do  any
metaphysical explanatory work (WILSON, 2014: 539-40). We are too unfamiliarized with the
discussion to pass any judgment. Below we discuss three cases of small-g grounding and
argue that they share certain features. We then note some analogies with causation.
Example one: On truth. Many and perhaps most theorists of truth believe that at least
some truths are explained by what there is. Very few believe the other way around, – that what
is true explains what there is, – although some argue that truth and reality are never related at
all. Granting that common view, we have that what exists grounds what is true. Perhaps we
wish to take sentences or statements (that is, an utterance of sentence-tokens) as the primary
25 Sometimes crucial  terms in metaphysics denote only families of properties or relations. For example,  as
LOWE (2015) argues, “ontological dependence” denotes a family of relations.
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bearers of truth-value. Then what grounds what is true is that certain things exist and that
certain sentences have been uttered. If we take the primary bearers of truth to be propositions,
and propositions to exist only when mentally tokenized, then what grounds what is true is that
certain things exist and that certain thoughts have been thought. And so on.
Example two: On generalizations and their instances. For brevity, we will sidestep issues
regarding (a)  quantifier  interpretation,  (b)  totality facts,  and (c)  priority monism’s Whole.
A (philosopher’s) common sense view of quantification is that existential and universal facts
are  metaphysically  explained  by  what  there  is.  The  existence  of  x grounds  the  fact  that
something exists. Supposing also the fact that x1, ...,  xN are all there is, it being the case that
x1, ..., xN are all F’s grounds the fact that everything is F.
Example three: On wholes and their parts. Priority pluralism is the thesis in hierarchical
metaphysics26 that all wholes are grounded in the parts of which they are composed. These
wholes may be understood as the (unstructured) mereological sum of their parts. Alternatively,
they may be a structured whole, in which part-part relations help individuate them.
The first of these examples allow us to highlight two features of grounding relations.
The  first  is  that  they  are  not  amenable  to  either  extensional  or  intensional  analyses.
Benjamin Schnieder (2011) points out and that this is so even outside the standard opaque
context of a propositional attitude, a contention for which we will argue. To explain why, we
will have to explain what an intensional analysis is.
We employ the Fregean analysis of the extension of various terms and the Carnapian
model of intension.27 Let w be any given possible world. The extension of a singular term in
w,  such  as  a  name  or  indexical,  is  what  the  inhabitant  of  w refers  it  to:  a  particular.
The extension at w of a predicate is the set of objects to which it applies at w. The extension
of a definite description at w is whatever uniquely satisfies it at w, if anything. The extension
of a sentence is its truth-value at w, if any. Now, the intension of any term at w is a function
from the set of all possible worlds (accessible from w) to the extension of that term at each
possible world. Two terms are co-extensional or co-intensional at w when, respectively, they
share extension or intension at all possible worlds (accessible from w).
26 Flat metaphysics  aims  to  describe  what  there  is  and  what  properties  it  has.  Hierarchical (or  ordered)
metaphysics aims to understand which things are prior and which are posterior. Metaphorically, it aims to
understand the structure of reality, how everything metaphysically hangs to together. The enterprise of disco-
vering reasons why seems to be hierarchical metaphysics. The terminology is from SCHAFFER (2012: §1.3).
27 The most problematic of Frege’s analysis is the common extension attributed to all nondenoting terms, such
as the null set. Any chosen object would generate distortions. Consider the resulting truth-value of something
like “Mr. Hamlet is a subset of any set.” But we will not discuss examples employing empty terms.
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The analysis of a term T is extensional or intensional, respectively, if and only if all of the
terms in the  analysans can be substituted for co-extensional or co-intensional terms either
salva  veritate or  salva  derivatione,  depending  on  the  type  of  semantics  we  prefer
(SCHNIEDER, 2011; SHER, 2018). A salva veritate substitution preserves the truth-value of
any  sentence  in  which  T occurs,  relative  to  any  world.  A  salva  derivatione substitution
preserves the inferential relations of any sentence in which T occurs, relative to any world.
A  term  is  hyperintensional  in  case  it  cannot  be  analyzed  in  intensional  terms.
(Unanalysable  terms have  one  analysans,  viz.,  themselves,  and thus  are  eligible  to  being
intensional.) A proof that some kind of grounding is hyperintensional requires a case study.
Let  us  examine the case of truthmaking.  Any case study of truthmaking would require  a
specific ontology, a precise notation and a semantics of truth; our lack of expertise will force
us  to  be accordingly imprecise.  Suppose we accept  two theses:  That  propositions are  the
primary truth-bearers and that they necessarily exist. Let ‘ P ’ denote the proposition ⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition that P.
We may say truly: “x’s being colored is grounded in x’s being red”. Since we intend to
discuss truth, we may alternatively say (perhaps also truly): “  ⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition x is colored ’s being true⌝’ denote the proposition  is
grounded in ⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition x is red ’s being true⌝’ denote the proposition ”. Now, suppose we can say truly:
(G)  “ P ’s being true is grounded in the world being such that P”.⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition 28
The relata in the predication (G) are: A state of affairs (a proposition’s having the property of
being true) and another state of affairs (the part of the world wherein P obtains). Sentences
expressing these states of affairs  are predications and therefore complete  sentences.  Their
extension at any w is then their truth-value at  w.  These two sentences have the same truth-
value at every w (and, a fortiori, at every w accessible from the actual world). Therefore, they
share extension at every w. As a result, they are co-intensional.
If  the  grounding  relation  were  an  intensional  predicate,  then  we  could  perform  the
following substitution salva veritate on (G): “the world being such that P is grounded in P ’⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition s
being true”. We may safely take this to be a falsehood (a necessary one, even). Therefore, the
grounding relation is hyperintensional. More examples of hyperintensionality can be found by
considering  relations  between  necessities.  Mathematical  necessities  may  bear  grounding
relations between themselves but not bear such relations towards metaphysical necessities
(such as water’s being H2O whenever it exists).
28 The roundabout locution “the world being such that” seems required to preserve grammaticality.
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The second feature worth highlighting is that grounding, like causation, seems to admit of
both  overdetermination  and  partiality.  There  is  something ’s  being  true  seems  to  be⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition 
(completely) grounded on each and every existent. We are not aware of skepticism about such
overdetermination. Causal overdetermination, by contrast, is highly contentious. For example,
in the transference theory of causation,  a single cause imparts  some quantity of a  certain
property (e.g. energy) into some other object. Two causes would impart more of that property,
which is a different effect. Overdetermination, however, requires that one of the causes be
sufficient for the entire effect. So causal overdetermination is impossible on that view. Other
views, seemingly, discover other difficulties with causal determination.
Now onto incompleteness.  Like partial  (i.e.  incomplete)  causes seem possible,  partial
grounds  also  seem possible.29 The  truth  of  P  partially  grounds  the  truth  of  P  Q ,⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition ⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ∧ Q⌝, ⌝’ denote the proposition 
supposing that Q  is also true.⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition  (Seemingly, partially or not, P  could not ground anything⌜P⌝’ denote the proposition ⌝’ denote the proposition 
which did not obtain.) Each part of a whole partially grounds the whole itself, given priority
pluralism. Finally, whenever a universal generalization is true, it is partially grounded by the
elements in its domain (or the truth of its substitutional instances).
This brings us to the question of whether complete grounds necessitate what they ground.
Partial grounds do not modally necessitate their groundee unless they necessarily co-occur
with other partial or complete grounds for that groundee. Likewise, partial causes, such as
“tendencies” (as in the propensity theory of probability) or “dispositions” (as in dispositional
essentialism),  do  not  necessitate  their  effects.  But  that  complete grounds  necessitate  their
groundees seems  to  be  a  common view.  Yet,  Ricki  Bliss  and  Kelly  Trogdon (2014:  §3)
mention a few articles from the past decade which dispute such necessitation. Grounding and
modality would then, indeed, bear no straightforward relationship.
Despite these two analogies between causation and grounding, viz., the possibilities of
overdetermination and partiality, and despite their being both sources of apparently the same
kind of  in-virtue-of  relation,  there  is  a  potentially  strong disanalogy.  Whereas  many take
causation  to  obtain  only  between  events,  many  accept  that  grounding  can  occur  among
abstracta, states of affairs, events, and perhaps also entities from other types. Furthermore, it
seems that grounding can occur between items of different ontological types, such as when
worldly facts  ground the truth of abstract propositions (BLISS & TROGDON, 2014: §3).
Perhaps, though, we have been unduly restrictive regarding causation.
29 For more on these, see BLISS & TROGDON (2014: §5).
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Explanatory power
Forward problems are about discovering the effects of known conditions. The inference to the
best explanation attempts to solve a  reverse problem:  discovering the reason why a known
effect occurred. Reverse problems are harder because many different initial conditions can
lead  to  the  same  end  result.  To  carry  out  the  task  of  discovering  true  explanations,
IBE employs a notion of a “best potential explanation”. In this section, we better explicate
what  better  explanations  are.  Before  beginning,  let  us  organize  our  work  relative  to  the
questions in which a student of explanation can be interested in. Given a data set E, we ask:
i. Definition. When is some H (potentially) explanatory of E?
ii. Comparison. When does some H1 (potentially) explain E more than some H2?
iii. Confirmation. When is some H’s (potentially) explaining E confirmatory of H?
At the beginning of Part II, we defined a notion of explanation and thus answered question i.
To get clear on what our answer meant, we saw the applied cases of grounding and causation.
On this section, we will argue that the above notion of explanation entails a certain notion of
explanatory power, forcing on us an answer to question ii. Explanatory power is how much
something explains.
Question  iii  matters the most for students of IBE. The other two are stepping stones.
We lack space to go deeply into it, but tackle it briefly twice. First, we examine whether one
aspect of explanatory power (namely, scope) is confirmatory. Second, we offer the so-called
miracle  tissue  argument,  for  the  conclusion  that  explanatory  power  is  not  confirmatory
by itself. Question iii is probed in more detail in another work.
We move on to answering the second question. Explanatory power is an essential part of
what it is to be the best potential explanation. We will later argue it is not the only part, and
that  other  theoretical  virtues  must  be  considered.  Now,  we argue these  two  measures  of
explanatory  power  are  forced  on  us  by  the  conception  of  explanation  as  a  reason-why:
completeness and scope. One is qualitative, the other quantitative.
Let us begin with completeness, since we have just done preliminary work for this on the
last page of the previous section. There are two ways to define the complete explanation of E:
(D1) The set of all reasons why E.
(D2) Any set of reasons why E which necessitates it.
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There are two ways for these definitions to diverge. First, in case E is necessitated by many
sets of reasons, i.e.,  E is overdetermined. D1 says only the set of these sets is the complete
explanation of E. D2 says any of these sets are already complete explanations of E. Second, in
case E is not necessitated by anything, i.e., E is underdetermined). D1 says the set of all the
insufficient  reasons  why  E occurs  is  the  complete  explanation  of  E.  D2  says  it  has  no
complete explanation. This dispute seems a matter of definition. We arbitrarily opt for D2.
Should there be chance events in reality, then we say there is no complete explanation of that
event.  One who speaks in the way of D1 would say that the complete explanation of the
chance event would be “faulty” or “permissive”: It could occur without that event occurring.
So, the more a hypothesis H approximates a complete explanation of E, – i.e., the more
elements of E it explains and the closer they are to being necessitated, – the more it explains
E, and thus the more explanatorily powerful it is with respect to E. Hence, completeness is a
measure of explanatory power. Underdetermined events do not have complete explanations.
One surprising result is that hypotheses which appeal to unlikely coincidences are not
weaker explanations for that – although they might well be worse explanations insofar as they
are unlikely.30 At any rate, they are not  less complete  explanations. A cosmic confluence of
factors may well be the complete reason why something occurs, like the statistically delicate
contraptions of a Rube Goldberg machine can completely cause its end result.
We finish the discussion of explanatory completeness by stating two unsolved problems.
First: Ceteris paribus clauses state that something is the case so long as certain conditions are
respected.  These  clauses  do  not  explicitly  specify  what  conditions  these  are.  Thus,
explanations involving ceteris paribus clauses fail to explicitly state the relevant reasons-why.
Should we consider hypotheses with such clauses to be incomplete? In a certain sense, the
ceteris paribus clause elliptically refers to each and every reason-why, since, presumably, the
truth-conditions  of  sentences  containing  ceteris  paribus  clauses  involve  the  omitted
conditions. Perhaps, then, they should be regarded as elliptical complete explanations.
Second: Can absences be reasons why something obtains? There are two sets of examples
which prima facie have absences as reasons-why. The first contains examples from everyday
life: The absence of a cookie in the jar is a reason why some kid is disappointed; the absence
of watering is a reason why some plant died; an ominous shadow (the absence of light) is a
30 Keep in mind our distinction between sheer explanatory power and loveliness (or explanatory goodness). The
latter is a measure constructed to serve the epistemic purposes of IBE: discovering true explanations. Strong
but unlikely explanations are thus bad explanations.
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reason why someone became worried. The second set of examples intrudes itself on cases
where presences (rather than absences) are reasons-why. Suppose we have some C standing as
a reason why  E obtains. It  seems that,  in giving the complete explanation of  E,  we must
mention the absence of any intervening factor that could have severed the connection between
C and E, for some appropriate modal scope. For example, the absence of finks, in the theory
of dispositions, is a reason why a stimulus led to a manifestation. The absence of defeaters, in
the theory of justification, is a reason why someone is justified in some belief. The absence of
preemptive causes, in the theory of causation, is a reason why something caused its effect.
Perhaps these can be restated only in terms of what is there, rather than what is not there.
If they cannot, then absences would seem capable of being reasons-why. The result is strange
because of our “thick” metaphysical view of reasons-why. How can that which is not there
ever make something happen or be the case, like causation and grounding do? The question is
as vague as questions in metaphysics get, and we do not know how to begin answering.
The second criterion is scope. It is a quantitative measure. Completeness measures how
well  each empirical  fact is  explained.  Scope  measures  how  many  empirical  facts  are
explained. There are some subtleties, however. We must not ignore the variety of explananda.
A hypothesis which explains very similar things does not have explanatory power. It explains
numerous times the same type of thing, but tokenized at  different times.  True quantity of
explanandum requires variety, either in the conditions of measurement or in the measured
objects. Note we will not get into the metaphysical mare’s nest of defining the criteria for two
data being “qualitatively different” (or belonging to different “classes of facts”). We will take
for granted an intuitive understanding of this notion.
Having defined completeness and scope,  we have finished our  answer to  question  ii.
We now briefly comment on whether explanatory power is confirmatory. There is reason to
think that it is so. Not, however, unrestrictedly – the miracle tissue argument would prohibit it.
When choosing among our plausible theories, their scope can be epistemically revealing.31
Unfortunately, not every kind of scope will be relevant. For instance, holding other things
constant, it is epistemically inert to introduce variations in daytime when doing experiments
in chemistry. Paul Horwich (1982: ch. 6) has an ingenious account. Consider that, if there
were  a  plausible  theory  according  to  which  variations  in  time  can  indeed  affect  an
31 Plausibility may be partially a function of theoretical virtuosity. For example, coherence with our background
theories (which is not just logical consistency with them). Plausibility is also determined by how it fits with
our observations, of course.
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experiment’s outcome, – say, because physical constants fluctuate over time, – then suddenly
it becomes epistemically relevant to have time-variety in the data. Among plausible theories,
a theory can be confirmed by being consistent with, predicting, or even explaining the data
which is inconsistent with, counter-predicted by, or unexplainable by many rival theories.
Horwich expands this idea into a general theory: The epistemic relevance for a theory T
of variation in data relative to a certain factor F depends on what plausible rival theories there
are.  As  foreshadowed,  a  few  conditions  should  be  met.  First,  some  predictions  of  most
of these theories should be to some degree a function of F. Second, if such variation is to be
capable of improving T’s epistemic status relative to its rivals, then these theories must, for
the most part, disagree with T about the outcomes of such variation. A wider variety of classes
of  fact  is  epistemically  relevant  insofar  as  it  is  capable  of  refuting  most  of  the  plausible
theories  about  the domain in  question.  Horwich provides  a  simple Bayesian proof  of the
epistemic relevance of this kind of scope, which we will not rehearse. If he is correct, then
this  kind of explanatory scope is confirmatory insofar as it is accompanied with the parallel
kind of predictive scope which Horwich discusses.
We conclude by asking: Do the alleged theoretical virtues of  simplicity  and  unification
increase explanatory power? We owe an explanation of why we did not include them in this
section. We believe that they indeed contribute to goodness and are, as some say, “explanatory
virtues” in this sense. However, they are so only because they seem to be theoretical virtues.
They seem to be properties typical of true explanations and untypical of false ones, but that’s
it.  As  we  have  seen,  explanatory  power  increases  as  a  theory  postulates  more  complete
explanations (i.e. stronger reasons-why) for more classes of facts (i.e. more reasons-why).
There seems to be no other tenable conception of explanatory power.
Simplicity, however defined, is orthogonal to completeness and scope. Unification, on the
other hand, is just explaining a many classes of facts in the same way, providing for them the
same reason-why R. Unification does not increase scope: although it requires a wide scope, it
does not  contribute  to it.  Neither does it  increase explanatory completeness:  It  fits  obser-
vations into overarching patterns but, since patterns in the sequence of events are posterior to
the events themselves, no more complete reasons-why for these events are presented.
Perhaps depth of explanation increases completeness: Would some E would be explained
more completely in case its explanation R was itself explained by another reason-why R*? We
will not pursue this, but the matter of explaining explainers will surface tangentially below.
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The wonder tissue argument 
The more an explanation is theoretically virtuous, the more likely it is – other things held
constant. So it makes sense to take into account theoretical virtuosity in assessing the best
explanation. It makes sense because it increases the inductive strength of IBE. This is not
surprising. What is perhaps surprising is that it  also makes sense to sacrifice considerable
explanatory power for the sake of theoretical virtuosity. So long as enough explanatory power
is  preserved,  the  result  of  the  trade-off  can  still  bear  the  title  of  the  best  explanation.
This claim raises two questions.
Question one: Epistemically, why is the trade-off worth it?
Question two: Epistemically, why not trade-off all explanatory power?
The answer to the first is: Explanatory power is easy to acquire by theft.  By ignoring the
demands  of  (alleged)  theoretical  virtues  such as  simplicity  and  non ad hocness,  one  can
trivially  formulate  a  theory  which  completely explains  every  single  datum,  thus  scoring
maximally in the two criteria for explanatory power: completeness and scope. We will argue
for this  claim by way of a case study, the “wonder tissue”,  which embodies a recipe for
creating false yet maximally powerful explanations.32
 An answer to the second we would wish to explore in further work is: Explanatory power
is very hard to acquire by honest toil. Should an explanation be simple, non ad hoc, coherent,
and so forth, perhaps will be at pains to provide solid reasons-why for a large number of data.
Consider how difficult scientists find it to discover a  single  virtuous theory which explains
(or even predicts, for that matter) their data. So, – one would somehow conclude, – when a
virtuous theory is indeed explanatory, this is indicative that it is true.
The  wonder  tissue  argument  begins  with  a  hypothesis  that  explains  a  data  set  E.
The hypothesis is that each of E’s constituent data was necessitated and grounded by a black
box entity, who’s got an  ad hoc  assortment of causal powers or grounding capacities – and
exerts  them  in  some  unexplained  (but  possibly  explainable)  way.  Perhaps  it  could  be
something of the form, “For every fact, known or unknown, God did it on a whim”, though
32 “Wonder tissue” is a term coined by Daniel  Dennett  to denote posited entities with strong metaphysical
powers, such as “thinking rationally” (e.g. a black-box faculty of Reason) or “creating the laws of nature”
(e.g. a mysterious divinity), but whose internal workings are completely unspecified. As a result, the strong
metaphysical powers of these entities remain completely unexplained. They are strong explainers and, all the
while, they are strongly unexplained. Something is fishy about wonder tissues. See chapter 22 of his Intuition
Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013.
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the black box needn’t be a divinity. The entity’s power is such that no other condition must
obtain in order for its powers to take effect; it is the sole source of what it causes or grounds.
Not having detailed the entity’s capacities and psychology, we have cheaply posited an
unexplained explainer – a wonder tissue. The wonder tissue certainly does not exist and quite
plausibly is a metaphysical impossibility. Nevertheless, the wonder tissue hypothesis remains
very explanatorily  powerful,  for reasons explained below. If  so,  then any version of IBE
which ranked potential explanations only according to their explanatory power would always
lead us to infer the existence of such a non-existent and perhaps  impossible wonder tissue.
Since  IBE is  used  as  a  guide  both  to  metaphysical  possibility  and to  actual  truth,  some
revision is forthcoming. One could employ another theory of explanation whose consequent
notion of explanatory power cannot be rigged in this way. But, having assumed an inflatio-
nary notion of explanation in order for IBE to be reliable we must take into account something
other than brute explanatory power. That is our thesis.
Now here  is  why  the  wonder  tissue  is  greatly  explanatory.  The  black  box’s  actions
provide an explanation for  each  explanandum  in  a  data  set  E,  and an explanation which
moreover necessitates what is explained. For example, the wonder tissue could have single-
handedly  and  continuously  grounded  or  caused  physical  objects  to  act,  as  a  matter  of
necessity,  in  accordance  with gravitational  law.  As such,  the  wonder  tissue can be set  to
completely explain anything. It can also be set to explain as many kinds of things as we want,
observable or not, making it also an explanation with the maximum possible scope. Therefore,
it is perfect in terms of explanatory power. We can produce multiple (incompatible) theories
of this sort, varying the details of the wonder tissue, and thus proliferate very powerful false
explanations. This defeats the truth-conducibility of pure explanatory power.
There is a hidden stumbling block which prevents the maximization of the explanatory
scope of our wonder tissue. Let E be any data set, and e1, …, eN its elements. It is possible that
E contains  internal explanatory information, i.e. observations of the form: “eX is the reason
why eY.” Some empiricists deny that facts of this form are ever part of our empirical data;
they are always part of a theory about the data. If so, so much the better. Otherwise, a black
box could not  be accepted  as  the sole  reason why some such  eY obtains.  The black box
hypothesis would contradict  E itself. To avoid this, we can shift our hypothesis so that the
black  box  in  question  has  grounded  only  the  observations  for  which  E has  no  internal
explanatory information. This limitation of scope applies to any theory, however, so that the
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wonder tissue hypothesis remains towering above other hypotheses in its explanatory power.
Explanatory power, then, is not truth-tropic by itself, i.e., in any context. That is, it is not
globally truth-tropic. This spells trouble for IBE, which takes explanatory power as the central
measure of explanatory goodness. Otherwise, there would not be much of an explanation to
the “best explanation”; this is why IBE cannot trade-off explanatory power away indefinitely.
This answers ‘question two’ above.
In order for IBE to be reliable, then, we must find some local context  conditioned on
which explanatory  power  becomes  truth-tropic,  and apply  IBE only  under  such  contexts.
For  instance,  restrictions  upon what  kinds  of  explanatory  hypothesis  we are  considering.
Perhaps simple, non ad hoc, unified, etc. hypotheses are a context in which explanatory power
indeed becomes strongly positively correlated with truth.
Consider  how  the  miracle  tissue  hypothesis  lacks  these  alleged  theoretical  virtues.
It includes the postulation of  ad hoc  causal powers and grounding capacities. It completely
lacks  predictive  power.  It  explains  complex  phenomena  via  a  black  box,  an  unexplained
explainer with wonderful capabilities, like a virtus dormitiva, which we should receive with
skepticism.  It  is  inconsistent  with  our  background  theories,  as  they  provide  various
explanations  to  our data,  whereas  the wonder tissue is  posited as the sole  explanation of
everything. Things get worse in case our wonder tissue is some sort of divinity – disembodied
minds with irreducible semantic and rational powers are nothing like anything else in our
scientific inventory. Notwithstanding, the wonder tissue remains explanatorily powerful. A
theoretical  vice  could  only  harm  explanatory  power  by  diminishing  either  scope  or
completeness. Prima facie, the above theoretical vices seem not to diminish these two.
In  case  it  still  feels  difficult  to  accept  the  explanatory  power  of  the  wonder  tissue,
consider the following scenario: If one were to suggest this hypothesis in an observational
situation, it would be appropriate to say: “Well, that would explain it – but, it is incredible and
ad hoc.” The emphasis on the subjunctive mark emphasizes the hypothetical (i.e. unlikely,
outlandish) nature of the potential  explanation,  but we do not consider that such a nature
diminishes the theory’s capacity to explain.
Let  the  black box equivalence thesis be  that,  other  things  held  constant,  unexplained
explainers can explain as well as explained explainers (that is, they have identical explanatory
power). One may even accept that unexplainable explainers can explain as well as explainable
explainers.  Now let  the  virtue-vice  equivalence thesis be  that,  other  things  held  constant,
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theoretically vicious explanations have as much explanatory power as virtuous counterparts.
These modalities of explanationism can come in global and local varieties too.
Our  discussion  of  explanatory  power  has  aimed  to  establish  both  theses,  given  the
inflationary theory of explanation. This allowed the wonder tissue argument to establish the
great  numerosity  of  explanations  who are  powerful,  vicious,  black  boxy,  and  false.  This
demonstrates that explanatory power is not globally truth-tropic, since wonder tissues do not
exist.33 To rescue IBE, we must construct our measure of explanatory goodness that decreases
as theoretical viciousness and black boxness increases, so that the best explanations, while
explanatorily  powerful,  are  neither  vicious nor black boxes.  Whether any such a measure
could be itself truth-topic is topic for subsequent investigation.
33 Although, on the PBS documentary A Glorious Accident (1993), Freeman Dyson has claimed, contra Daniel
Dennett, that physicists posit wonder tissues all of the time to do some required causal work. We’d reply that
the posited fields and particles are not as wonderful as the complex capacities our above hypotheses posit.




THE INFERENCE AGAINST A NON-EXPLANATION (IAN)
Theories can fail to explain some data. This is inconsequential insofar as the data in question
are outside the theory’s domain. Theories can, however, fail to explain data in their domain.
Insofar as we expect these data to be explainable, the theory in question is thus likely to be
incomplete. It may nevertheless be true as far as it goes. Trouble comes in two scenarios.
First, when a theory renders something explainable only by a cosmic coincidence, when we
have reason to think it has a non-accidental explanation. Second, when it makes it likely that
something we expect to have an explanation does not, in fact, have an explanation.
We might have called theories of those two kinds  anti-explanations, but we call them
non-explanations for the sake of a good acronym to name our inference. If we infer from a
theory’s being a non-explanation that it is false, we have performed an Inference Against a
Non-explanation (IAN). Below we justify this inference-type and consider two applications.
Certain things can be acceptably unexplainable. Baffling as it may be, explanations have
to end somewhere. Basic causal powers, metaphysical laws, and logico-mathematical rules
are  likely  to  hold  for  no reason at  all.  Other  nonfundamental  facts  but  still  hold for  no
perspicuous reason, in the sense of being the products of a chance confluence of causes and
other reasons-why. A theory which explains them would merely detail the step-wise chain of
coincidences  which produced them, but  does offer  any  counterfactually-robust  reason for
their occurrence (unless it is supposed that the modal space over which counterfactuals range
is also inhabited by worlds with similar chance events).
A third class of events is those neither fundamental (and are thus somehow explainable)
nor accidental. We are of the opinion that complex regularities pertain to this class. While the
Humean metaphysician accepts the nonfundamentality of complex regularities, he believes
they are explainable only in terms of chance. We hold this combination of chance and order to
be extremely unlikely. (Even order arising in chaotic systems in natural phenomena is not due
to chance, but arises due to causal interaction among its parts.) So no adequate theory could
make it unlikely or impossible for complex regularities to have a counterfactually-robust and
ultimately non-chancy reason for their occurrence. If we accept that, there are consequences
for our approach to matters in metaphysics. Below we offer two examples.
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First, high-level facts about how organisms generate consciousness. The natural laws in
question would be too complicated to be simply primitive.34 Plus, it couldn’t occur merely by
chance. The reason is that there is a systematic  match-up between organismic behavior and
phenomenal character – i.e., between phenomenal reports and phenomenality itself. Here are
illustrative examples. Phenomenal suffering is correlated with stimulus avoidance: A match
between physical and phenomenal aversiveness. The experience of spatially arranged items
matches  our  report  of  a  spatially  arranged environment.  Finally,  the  visual  experience  of
contrasting colors is correlated with the physical capacity to discriminate colored objects. For
example, colorblind people do not experience colored objects as sharply distinct, and this is
matched by their inability to  discriminate their physical correlates. Given this surely non-
accidental match-up, there must be  mechanisms or  governing laws sensitive to phenomenal
character and which produce physical effects appropriate to that character. Theories which
imply there being no such reasons are rightly discarded by IAN.35
The second example, which has already been foreshadowed, is that certain metaphysical
views, such as metaphysical Humeanism, leave the possible sequences of events perfectly
unconstrained. Individual events may be constrained by their individual natures, but there is
no constraint relative to which distinct events are co-present or temporally sequential. Such a
view would make it exceedingly unlikely for reality to exhibit any widespread, enduring order
– yet, we know that it has exhibited such an order since its very beginning. This is a breath-
takingly unlikely event for the Humean. Since the Humean cannot explain non-accidentally
this ordering, IAN discards it (and, seemingly, quite justifiedly).
A final example, which we will not expand upon, involves the difficulties that scientific
antirealism has in explaining why certain scientific theories are successful while others aren’t.
Most antirealist attempts at this are at best sketchy (KUKLA, 1996). Since it is to be expected
that scientific success is non-accidentally explainable, antirealism is at odds with IAN.
IAN is an inference more modest than IBE. Consider that IAN is weak enough so as not
to even reject miracle tissue explanations. While IBE assumes that the world is stratified by
powerful and virtuous explanations, IAN merely assumes that most of its patterns have some
non-accidental explanations, rather than being primitive or only accidentally explained.
34 This is not to say physicalism is true. Perhaps these laws linking phenomenal consciousness to access cons-
ciousness in complex psychologies may derive from much simpler  primitive psycho-physical laws linking
physical properties (such as information) to phenomenal properies. Such a primitive nonphysical law would
defeat physicalism on any of its versions.
35 Explaining this match-up is part of the so-called hard problem of consciousness. The problem is hard because
theorists have (arguably) not came up with a single potential explanation of the match-up short of denying it.
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CONCLUSION
We often perform inferences without awareness of their governing principles and niceties.
The principles and details relevant to deductive inferences have been exhaustively studied, but
the study of non-inductive inferences has not fared so well. Proponents of any non-deductive
mode of inference face a hard task of  describing their  inference rules, which can rival in
difficulty the effort of justifying them. Explanationists face a descriptive problem of this kind.
Their lack of success so far has led to serious charges of obscurity (LIPTON, 2004).
We have not come to the point of assessing the inductive strength of IBE, tackling the
problem of justification. However, we have covered much of the ground leading up to such a
valuation,  by tackling the problem of  description.  Different  notions  of  explanation output
IBEs with differently inductive strengths. Hopefully, we have also alleviated to some degree
charges of obscurity against IBE.
After outlining what theories of explanation aim to do, we have chosen, explicated, and
applied a notion of explanation which is of special interest to metaphysicians: in-virtue-of
relations or, what is the same thing, reason-why relations. We then argued that this theory of
explanation implies a considerably narrow notion of explanatory power, which is seemingly
independent of theoretical virtues such as simplicity, non ad hocness, and unificatory power.
This allowed us to argue that explanatory power can be obtained quite easily by manifestly
false theories. As a result, explanatory power per se is not truth-tropic. Since the ranking of
best  explanations  used  in  IBE necessarily  puts  great  weight  into  explanatory  power,  this
creates the worry that IBE is a terrible inference.
We conclude that a reliable version of IBE requires its premises to state that a certain
local context, in which explanatory power is indeed truth-tropic, has obtained. One possible
such local context is the presence of other (alleged) theoretical virtues in our explanatory
hypotheses. Somewhat plausibly, it is a great achievement (and a sign of truth) if a simple,
non ad hoc, and externally coherent theory achieves great explanatory power. A full assess-
ment of IBE, therefore, requires analyzing how explanatory power fares when conditioned
upon the presence of these theoretical virtues.
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